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I INTRODUCTION
Since 1970 when Congress established the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to implement and enforce national air-
quality standards under the Clean Air Act considerable economic
and legal challenges have surfaced which question the efficiency
and legitimacy of federal and state environmental regulations.
The 1970 legislation and subsequent amendments were also
significant in that they set in motion the creation of
unprecedented federal and state regulations directed at
controlling environmental quality. The Clean Air Act was soon
followed by other major Federal environmental legislation
including the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Noise Control Act, and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
What began as a legitimate national response to the serious
issue of environmental degradation has resulted in an
administrative quagmire that has produced regulations with
arguably a negative cost/benefit to society. As a prime example,
economists often point to the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments which required the EPA to develop specific effluent
limits on waterborne pollutants for each type of industrial
process. By 1977 the effluent limits were to be consistent with
the use of "the best practicable control methods" and by 1983
tighter limits based on "best available technology" were to be
enforced. The economist argument is that regulations, however
detailed, cannot be written to cover all the individual
situations that arise. Once determinations are made on a case-
by-case basis involving regulators, administrative hearing
panels, and ultimately the courts, the standards for
environmental regulation break down. The ineffectiveness of EPA
policy is certainly one of administrative overload, but moreover,
one of imprecise knowledge on the alternative ways to reduce
pollution that vary widely in effectiveness and cost for
different industries.
Perhaps nowhere have the limits of regulatory control been
more pronounced than in the implementation of the 1980
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA). It was the regulatory intent of the EPA under
CERCLA's Superfund program to respond to emergencies at
uncontrolled sites, clean up the sites, and manage any other
related problems. Individual states responded by enacting their
own hazardous waste laws to deal with the smaller and more
numerous uncontrolled sites not addressed by the Federal
Superfund program.
On March 23, 1983, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Materials Release Prevention and
Response Act, better known as Chapter 2lE. The spector of 2lE
has loomed over the State's business and industry for the past
eight years. The idiosyncratic twists of this piece of
legislation has left many industrial owners and developers mired
in confusion and even helplessness. On October 3, 1987 the
Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) went into effect which set
forth regulations that detail the comprehensive process necessary
for remediating a contaminated property. Ironically, the MCP has
made the process of site remediation more burdensome for both
industry and the State's Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP), whose responsibility it is to administer the regulations.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic
development perspective on the problems encountered with the
implementation of Chapter 2lE in the State of Massachusetts.
This perspective is particularly relevant in light of proposed
amendments to the Law which are expected to go into effect by
July of 1992. The proposed amendments are significant from both
the State and federal level in that the legislation will
privatize the response actions at disposal sites and provide more
flexible, case-by-case standards for the containment and
remediation of both priority and non-priority sites. The
proposed amendments are a major departure from the "command and
control" environmental regulations of the past two decades.
Therefore, the paper will devote special attention to the new
legislation and how these changes may alleviate much of the
confusion and rancor that has existed under the current 21E Law.
II LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The efficiency and effectiveness of environmental
regulations have long been a topic of heated debate among private
industry, environmentalists, economists, and public policymakers.
While the arguments are many and complex, both pro and con, the
core of the debate is essentially one of degree of social
intervention. Interestingly, even conservative economists
recognize the negative externalities associated with industrial
pollution and the need for a public response to the market
failure. However, most economists and certainly private industry
would argue that the "command and control" methods employed by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in establishing
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environmental standards is both inefficient and wasteful.
Environmental groups and the majority of our nation's
policymakers need only point to the levels of pollution and tons
of hazardous wastes produced each year in the United States to
make their case for strict environmental standards. In fact, the
prevalent view among the public and in Washington is that the air
and water legislation enacted in the 1970's led to important
gains that must be preserved and strengthened by resisting the
efforts of industry to weaken the laws. Environmental lobbyists
continue to effectively portray the industrialist as the fat,
cigar-smoking "bad guy" with the toxic waste pipe protruding from
the rear of his factory. This exaggerated image, which industry
has been effectively lax at shedding, is given credence with the
memory of Love Canal indelibly implanted in the minds of many
4
Americans, and more recently supported by a 1987 EPA study that
estimated 550 million pounds of toxic substances have been dumped
into our nation's waters.
As a result of earlier and similar findings, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 was enacted to
manage the amounts of newly generated hazardous wastes. Not long
after the passage of this legislation, it became apparent that a
separate federal program was needed to manage the cleanup of
previously contaminated or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) was established.
At the time of enactment, the extent and scope of the
problems that the CERCLA program would be facing at these
uncontrolled sites was not clear. There was little scientific
and comprehensive understanding of the risks associated with
hazardous releases, especially with the long-term effects. As a
result, Congress limited the scope of the Superfund program by
directing the EPA to set up a Hazard Ranking System to obtain a
numerical rating for sites which would then determine whether or
not a site would be included on the National Priority List (NPL).
A site had to be listed on the NPL before it could be considered
for any site remediation. The Superfund program was directed to
list at least 400 sites on the NPL which needed remedial cleanup.
In spite of the controversy over the amount needed to support the
Superfund program, Congress limited the program to $1.6 billion
2over 5 years.
Due to the limited nature of the Federal Superfund Program,
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some states have enacted their own State Superfund program to
deal with the smaller and more numerous uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites within their state lines. Massachusetts became one
of the first states in the nation to enact its own superfund law.
The Massachusetts Superfund Law (M.G.L. Chapter 2lE),
enacted by state legislators in 1983, gave the Department of
Environmental Protection expanded authority to require the
assessment and cleanup of hazardous waste sites by the private
sector. It also directed DEP to proceed with work when private
parties failed to act in a timely manner, and authorized the
agency to recover up to three time~; its response action costs
from those parties.
Amendments to the Superfund Law, in the form of an
initiative petition overwhelmingly supported by voters in 1986,
set specific requirements and timelines for DEP's progress in
identifying, assessing and cleaning up contaminated properties.
Among other things, the amendments required the agency to
identify at least 1,000 suspected hazardous waste sites per year,
complete investigations of sites within two years of their being
listed, and ensure completion of a permanent remedy within four
3to seven years, depending on site classification.
Massachusetts Chapter 2lE parallels both CERCLA and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Chapter 2lE,
Section 3 requires that the DEP take all action appropriate to
secure to the Commonwealth the benefits of CERCLA, FWPCA and
other pertinent federal laws. Under Section 3, the DEP shall
6
promulgate such regulations as it deems necessary for the
implementation, administration, and enforcement of 21E, FWPCA,
CERCLA and other pertinent laws.
Section 3A of the Law provides that the DEP, in developing
its initial list of locations to be investigated, consider any
existing lists of potential disposal sites previously compiled by
the EPA. Section 3A(k) goes on to state that the DEP make every
effort to provide the documentation required under CERCLA in
order to make sites eligible for federal response action monies.4
Chapter 21E consists of eighteen (18) Sections each dealing
with the roles and responsibilities of the DEP and Potentially
Responsible Parties (PRP's). From a legislative perspective
there are five (5) key provisions of the Law which should be
5highlighted:
Section 4 - Response Action Authority
The DEP, whenever it has reason to believe that oil or
hazardous material has been released or that there is a threat of
release of o~l or hazardous material, is authorized to take or
arrange for such response actions as it reasonably deems
I
necessary. This Section involves the three (3) distinct and
critical phases of the response action: site assessment,
containment action, and cleanup and removal.
Section 5 - Liability Provisions
This Section defines Potentially Responsible parties as
current owners, past owners, transporters, and any person who
otherwise caused or is legally responsible for a release or
threat of release of oil or hazardous material from a vessel or
7
site, shall be liable, without regard to fault to the
Commonwealth for all costs of assessment, containment, and
removal pursuant to Section 4.
Section 7 - Notification
Any owner operator of a site or vessel, and any person
otherwise described in Section 5, as soon as he has knowledge of
a release or a threat of release of oil or hazardous material,
shall immediately notify the DEP at once.
The principal appeal in this Section is that it is not a
crime to be a PRP, but failure to notify is criminal!
Section II - Civil Penalties
The presumption is that any violation of the Law shall be
presumed to constitute irreparable harm to the public health,
safety, welfare or environment.
Fines can be up to $25,000 for each violation and two years
imprisonment. However, for persons in violation of Section 7, a
fine of up to $100,000 or imprisonment in the State prison for
not more than twenty years or in a jailor house of correction
for not more than two and one-half years or both, for each
violation. Each day such violation occurs or continues shall be
considered a separate violation.
Section 13 - Lien Provisions
Any liability to the Commonwealth under the Law shall
constitute a debt to the Commonwealth. The debt plus interest at
a rate of 12 percent per annum shall constitute a lien on all
property owned by persons liable under Chapter 2lE. Any lien
recorded, registered or filed pursuant to this section shall have
8
priority over any prior encumbrances with respect to any site
other than real property devoted to single or multi-family
housing.
Since its adoption in 1983, there have been two (2)
significant amendments to 21E which have further strengthened the
Law's regulatory provisions. Section 3 "authorized and directed"
the DEP to prepare the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) and
Section 3A - the 1986 Ballot Question 4 Amendment - provided
timetables and specifications for action at disposal sites.
The Massachusetts Contingency Plan set forth regulations
which establish requirements and procedures for identifying,
evaluating and cleaning up releases of oil or hazardous
materials. These matters had been previously governed by the
general provisions of 21E.
The MCP put forth regulations that detailed the
comprehensive process necessary for addressing contaminated
property. Directed primarily at historic contamination, the MCP
begins the process with notification requirements, then proceeds
to placement of the site on a list and then through a number of
phases of investigation and remedial response actions. All of
these aspects are described in brief below.
Site Investigation and the Remediation Process
Notification Reguirements
The MCP explains in detail how to report to DEP when a
release of oil or other hazardous substance is discovered. The
notification rules apply to any "release or threat of release"
which occurs after August 31, 1988. Pre-existing contamination
9
is also governed by Chapter 2lE. For new and potential releases,
the MCP states that any person who is liable under Chapter 21E is
held responsible to notify DEP "as soon as possible but not more
than two hours after obtaining knowledge of a release or threats
of release to the environment ...unless the person responsible for
notifying persuades the Department that extenuating circumstances
prevented such notification." The penalties for failing to
report are substantial fines and/or imprisonment.
The notification regulations define how to determine whether
or not the substance released is oil or a hazardou~ material.
The rules also define reportable quantities of oil or hazardous
materials, the release of which determines the reporting
obligation. The MCP states that the notification rules do not
only apply to an accidental spill but also to a continuous or
intermittent release.
Site Listing Most places where there is either an oil or a
hazardous substance release is called a "disposal site." These
sites are subject to the MCP requirements and regulations. DEP
maintains four classification lists of disposal sites:
- Locations To Be Investigated (LTBI) - locations which DEP
considers likely to be disposal sites;
- Confirmed Disposal Sites
- Remedial Sites - sites which have been cleaned up to DEP's
approval; and
- Deleted Sites - sites which for one reason or another no longer
need remediation.
10
Site Assessment and Remedial Response
The MCP dictates five stages of remedial response actions
that the Potentially Responsible Party must go through. These
stages go from the initial assessment of site contamination the
final cleanup and monitoring of the site. Deadlines are imposed
which should assure the completion of DEP criteria at different
stages in the process. Failure to meet a deadline is in
violation of the MCP and threatens civil and administrative
penalties.
1) Preliminary Assessment (PA):
The PA is the initial evaluation of a site which determines
whether it is a disposal location, whether any immediate clean-up
measures need to be taken or whether further remedial response
actions need to occur. The PA must be completed one year from
the initial listing of the site on the LTBI or Disposal list.
2) Phase One - Limited Site Investigation:
Phase one investigation confirms that the location is a
disposal site. It provides information to DEP so that it can
classify the site as either a priority or non-priority disposal
site. This classification determines the degree of attention the
site receives from DEP and the ability of the Potentially
Responsible Party to bypass certain DEP requirements through a
waiver Classification as a priority site results in the site
being placed on a fast-track cleanup schedule and it may also
trigger public involvement requirements.
3) Phase Two - Comprehensive Site Assessment:
The Comprehensive Site Assessment is just what its name
11
implies, a comprehensive investigation and assessment of the
environmental risks and problems at the site. This phase
determines the extent and nature of the contamination, determines
the type and quantity of oil or hazardous substance and
characterizes and evaluates the risk to the public and
environment presented by the site. A phase two report must be
presented to the DEP for approval.
One of the most significant aspects of this phase is the
risk characterization provision. rrhe MCP requires that the level
of contamination at the site be compared to nationally-recognized
standards. It also may require a process that attempts to
scientifically and numerically determine the health risks posed
by the site. If the level of contamination exceeds the national
clean-up standards, the site must be cleaned up accordingly. An
exception would be if the levels of contamination that exist at
the site after removal of the disposal site's contaminants still
exceed the pertinent national standards. In this case, DEP may
approve a remediation process that cleans the site only to the
background levels.
There is no deadline for completion of this phase, however,
there is a deadline for implementing the chosen remedy which
drives this time frame.
4) Phase Three - Development of Remedial Response Alternatives
and the Final Remedial Response Plan:
After completion of Phase Two, the PRP must develop a number
of alternatives for site remediation, evaluate their feasibility
and recommend one for approval by DEP. The MCP specifies
12
different categories of alternatives that fall under on-site
treatment, off-site treatment, on-site containment or disposal,
off-site disposal and no action. The recommended response action
must be one that meets the clean-up standards identified in Phase
Two.
A Phase Three report, which includes the proposed remedy,
must be submitted to the DEP for approval. It may be submitted
concurrently with the Phase Two report, with prior permission from
the DEP.
5) Phase Four
- Implementation of Approved Remedial Response Alternative:
Phase Four involves three activities: the development of a
Remedial Response Implementation Plan; the construction, initial
operation and maintenance of the proposed remedy; and the
preparation of the final inspection report upon construction
completion. Both the plan and the report must be submitted to
the DEP for approval.
The MCP requires that priority disposal sites have a
permanent or temporary solution implemented within four years of
initial listing as an LTBI. Non-priority disposal sites must
have a Final Remedial Response Plan completed within seven years.
Once there is satisfactory completion of Phase Four activities,
DEP determines that the work has been completed and approves the
final inspection report.
Short-Term Measures:
The MCP states that when and if situations arise that pose
an immediate threat to human health or the environment, an
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immediate response is required in the form of "Short-Term
Measures." A Short-Term Measure is not subject to the lengthy
requirements described above, although once completed it must go
through the remaining phases of remedial response. DEP approval
must be obtained before initiating a Short-Term Measure.
Although the MCP provides for procedures whereby the extent
and nature of a release or threat of release of oil or hazardous
material can be "consistently" and "appropriately" addressed, the
regulations do not specify the time frame for DEP approval.
Industry will also argue that there are no clear standards and
6guidelines for assessing and cleaning up contaminated sites.
The MCP is intended to complement the National Contingency
Plan by setting forth the roles and responsibilities of the DEP,
Potentially Responsible parties, other persons, other
governmental agencies, and the public in response actions. While
the MCP does provide procedures and guidance for notification and
responsibility under the Law, it has been apparent for the past
several years that requirements relative to the assessment and
response to disposal sites has been ambiguous and often
confrontational for both governmental officials and industry.
The following chapters review the problems associated with
the current 2lE Law, including several case studies involving
industrial sites. Lastly, the proposed 1992 amendments to the
Law will be assessed to determine whether privatizing hazardous
waste cleanup might improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the program.
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III THE 2lE PROBLEM
Many of the problems associated with 21E can be directly
attributed to those subsequent amendments to the Law which,
though well intentioned, were void of effective public policy
deliberation and action. The 1986 Voters Amendment, also known
as Section 3A of the Law, required that the DEP establish
timetables and specifications for action at disposal sites.
Under the amendment, plans were to be developed which specified
future staff, equipment, funding and resource needs, the timing
of those needs, and changes in current staffing and equipping
procedures necessary to ensure that the program will conform to
the requirements of the Law and the amendment without undermining
7the progress of any other programs of the Department. In
response, State lawmakers in 1987 authorized 519 DEP staff
positions to implement the expanded voters demand. However, due
to budget cuts in recent years the Department's waste site
cleanup staff has never exceeded half the authorized level. With
a current staff of 220, DEP is unable to meet most of the demands
8contained in the Superfund Law Amendment.
As the DEP was formulating its timetables and specifications
under Section 3A, the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) went
into effect. Originally part of the 1983 Legislation, the MCP,
which became effective on October 3, 1987 established
requirements for responding to releases and threats of releases
of oil and hazardous materials in the Commonwealth. Prior to the
MCP property owners could proceed at their own risk with the
15
cleanup of a contaminated site. Instead, owners must now obtain
prior approval from the DEP at each of five (5) separate stages
9of the cleanup process. As summarized in the preceding Chapter,
the MCP requires that an owner of a site notify the DEP upon
knowledge of a release. Therefore, if a Phase I investigation
shows that a release has occurred, no additional work can be
performed on the site to further "assess" or "cleanup" a release
10without DEP involvement.
With DEP approval, or the obtainment of a Waiver (if certain
conditions are met) a Phase II - Comprehensive Site Investigation
can be performed. This typically consists of extensive
subsurface evaluation to determine the source and extent of
release. This phase concludes with a Risk Assessment which
determines the risk that the release poses to the surrounding
environment. Alternatives are explored and the Final Remedial
Response Plan is designed. Phase IV consists of the
implementation of this plan and Phase V deals with the operation
and maintenance of the remediation method, if necessary.
The "phased approach" outlines the methodology involved in
evaluating real. estate for environmental liabilities. A thorough
Preliminary Assessment consists of research into the history of a
site and its surrounding properties to determine if historical
uses may have adversely affected the site. Research resources
may include the fire department, clerk's office, assessor's
office, board of health, building inspector, library, planning
office, sewer and water departments, registry of deeds,
historical society, present and past owners, operators and
16
abutters, and the DEP.
The combination of the 1986 Amendment (Section 3A) and the
1987 MCP has created a bureaucratic overload for the process of
hazardous waste cleanup. Owners of contaminated sites and other
PRP's have sarcastically remarked that the paper generated before
work can even begin could probably soak up the chemicals of most
spills.
The Morphology of a 21E Investigation and Response - The Borden
Chemical Company, Leominster, Massachusetts
As previously discussed, the 21E process involves a variety
of actors, each with opposing values, interests, and motivations.
A confrontational problem also exists due to the lack of clearly
defined and agreed upon standards for risk assessment and the
permanent solutions for hazardous waste sites. So while the MCP
responds to the public's clear mandate by establishing a cleanup
process that is consistent, strict, and highly protective of
public health and the environment, the technology and science of
hazardous waste cleanup lacks clarity and consensus concerning
the most effective and efficient standards to be employed. The
result is that interminable delays have become commonplace with
no guarantee that in the end clean is clean enough.
The Borden Chemical site in Leominster, Massachusetts is
representative of the problems inherent in the 21E process. The
Borden Company ceased its manufacturing operations in 1987, some
thirty two years after setting up operations and assuming the
17
production of vinyl acetate from American Polymer.
In a letter dated October 24, 1989, the Borden Chemical
Company was notified by the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection that their property was classified as a
"priority disposal site" pursuant to t.he Interim Site
Classification Contingency Plan. Although hydrogeologic
assessments were being performed on the site since April of 1987,
the new DEP classification required that no further remedial
response actions could occur without first obtaining DEP's
approval at the required phases under the Massachusetts
Contingency Plan.
Historical accounts indicate that the Borden Chemical
Company constructed a polyvinyl chloride (PVC) resin plant in
1956 and produced PVC resins from polyvinyl chloride monomer
(VCM). A PVC compounding plant was used to mix the PVC resin
with modifiers and stabilizers to produce clear PVC pellets for
blow molding. The American Polymer's operation most likely
became one of the Polyco plants which produced latexes of
polyvinyl acetate, polyvinyl chloride, and acrylics; vinyl
acetate monomer, and glacial acetic acid. A Styrene-Butadiene
operation was also in place at one time along Aspinwall Avenue,
however, the compounding plant and styrene-butadiene plants were
11
closed sometime in 1974 or 1975.
The major waste producer on-site was most likely the PVC
resin plant. A 1974 EPA study described the polymerization
12process as follows:
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The Suspension PVC Polymerization Process
VCM Storage Spheres - At Borden, there are two VCM storage
spheres, each with a capacity of 230,000 gallons. Liquid VCM is
brought in by rail. The VCM gas in the spheres is pumped into
the railroad car which forces the liquid VCM out of the car into
the spheres. When all the liquid is drawn out, a vacuum is drawn
on the line and excess gas vapors in the railroad car are sucked
back into the spheres. A positive pressure of approximately 2
psi is left in the car to prevent air from entering the car.
1) During plant operation, approximately 225 tons per month of
sludge consisting of settled solids from the various
wastewater streams accumulated in the waste lagoon. The
normal capacity of the lagoon ~7as 1,500,000 gallons and its
maximum capacity was 2,200,000 gallons. Liquid effluent from
,~
the lagoon was discharged to Leominster's POTW for treatment
and subsequent discharge into the Nashua River.
Approximately every 2-3 years, accumulated sludge in the
lagoon was dredged and transported to the municipal landfill
for disposal.
2) During plant operation, approximately 65 tons per month of
scrap resins, off-spec product and reactor cleanings were
stored above ground in the southern portion of the holding
lagoon. After aging, the waste resins were incorporated into
the settled sludge for subsequent landfill disposal.
3) Vinyl chloride gas was derived from a wastewater "stripper"
and incinerated. The stripped wastewater was neutralized and
discharged to Leominster's POTW.
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4) During plant operation, approximately 20 tons per year of
waste cleaning solutions and 2 tons per year of resorcinol
were stored in tanks or drums for subsequent shipment and
disposal in an approved secure landfill.
It should be noted that the above and below ground tank
storage areas, chemical transfer areas, and drummed storage areas
for waste and process chemicals are suph that inadvertent spills
or leakage would either discharge directly into the ground or
into the storm sewers which eventually discharge into the Nashua
River. Therefore, each of these areas was evaluated during the
investigation.
Based on raw materials usage reports, potential contaminants
may include the following:
PRODUCTION CHEMICALS
PRODUCTION QUANTITY USED (approx.)
7,000 tons/month
400-500 tons/month
9 tons/month
4-5 tons/month
5 tons/month
3-4 tons/month
1/2 tons/month
CHEMICAL
vinyl chloride
vinyl acetate
ethyl acrylate
d-n-octylphthalate
n-butyl acrylate
trichloroethylene
methyl methacrylate
butadiene
styrene
unknown
unknown
20
MISC. OTHER CHEMICALS
(i.e., waste cleaning solutions, laboratory chemicals, etc.)
acetone cyclohexane
diethyl phthalate phenol
methyl ethyl ketone methanol
recorcinol
The hydrogeologic assessment dated April 10, 1987 identified
volatile compounds including trichloro~thylene, vinyl chloride,
benzene, toluene, and phenol in soils and groundwater. On March
27, 1989 five (5) monitoring wells sampled noted vinyl chloride,
TCE, and styrene which were processed in large quantities on the
site until the plant processing facilities were closed down in
1986.
Based on the hydrogeologic assessment the following areas
were identified as those areas where past operational activities
would have been most likely to have resulted in a potential
impact on the subsurface soils and/or ground-water:
1) Lagoon located within the valley between the upland areas.
2) RCRA Drum Storage Area located south of the old Compound
Plant.
3) Old Drum Storage Area located east of the Polyco Building.
4) Maintenance Drum Storage Area located adjacent to the
Maintenance Shop.
5) Laboratory Drum Storage Area located east of the Laboratory.
6) Above and Below Ground Polyco Tank Farm Area located north of
the Polyco Building.
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7) Below Ground Fuel Oil Tanks Area located west of the security
office at the plant entrance.
8) Mounded Tank Area located west of the RCRA Drum Storage Area.
9) Styrene/Butadiene Above Ground Tank Area located in valley
west of lagoon.
10) Wastewater Above Ground Tank Area located in the western most
portion of the valley.
11) TCE/Vinyl Acetate Above Ground Tanles and Materials Transfer
Area located west of the PVC Building.
12) Bulk Silo Storage and Transfer Area located immediately
adjacent and south of the PVC Building.
13) PVC Railroad Transfer Area located along the western property
boundary.
14) Old Styrene/Butadiene Plant Area located on the southern
upland terrace.
15) Old Compound Plant Loading Area located immediately adjacent
and south of the Compound Plant.
16) Steam Plant Area located east of the lagoon.
Under the monitoring and supervision of the DEP, remediation
work has commenced on the site. Initial hazardous waste removal
has been confined to the PVC tank farm area and silos located
south of the lagoon and in close proximity of Fall Brook.
With the confinement of hazardous wastes at the site, and
subsequent DEP approval of a remediaton plan, the Borden Company
in May of 1991 submitted a "Waiver of Approvals" application 'to
DEP's Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup for a twenty-acre portion of
the site determined to be "non-priority." The MCP allows those
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conducting response actions at non-priority disposal sites to
apply for a waiver of required approvals. A waiver of approvals
provides the opportunity for accelerated remediation of non-
priority disposal sites. Waivers are granted to PRP's or other
persons who have engaged an expert in the field of oil and
committed to conducting a remedial response action in a timely
manner and in accordance with the Law and the MCP. When a waiver
is granted, remedial response actions still must meet all the
requirements of the Law and the MCP, including submittal of all
documents of the DEP. However, approvals of reports and plans
are not required by the Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup as long as
the waiver remains in effect. A waiver of approvals will
13expedite the performance of a remedial response action.
The DEP initiated a sixty (60) day review period of Borden's
Waiver Application by issuing a notification to the City of
Leominster's City Council, Board of Health, and Fire Department
which also elicited their comments. In August of 1991, the
Waiver of Approvals application was approved by the DEP and a
Final Response Plan was prepared by the Borden Company's
engineering contractors. Site remediation of both the priority
and non-priority locations of the entire Borden property continue
on at present, approximately four and one-half years since the
Company performed its initial hydrogeologic assessments.
The Borden 21E site is characteristic of the hazardous waste
cleanup problems associated with older industrial properties,
specifically, those which housed mature industries such as
plastics, furniture, and paper. The environmental problems
23
inherent in these sites can trace back to over one hundred years.
Clearly, any economic development strategy involving existing and
former mill sites must presuppose environmental considerations
and potential liability issues. Even in good economic times, the
2lE process and resultant liability has directly slowed the rate
of industrial growth in the State of Massachusetts.
Banks, who would have to wait for State recovery of any such
superlien to get paid off before they could recover their loans,
have become increasingly hesitant to lend in what was originally
14
a buyer's market. Whether or not they are actually imposed, just
the possibility of superliens has greatly affected the value and
15
marketability of contaminated sites.
In today's down economic market it was expected that a
decrease in environmental site assessments would oCcur.
Apparently, this has not been the case and the explanation is
twofold:
First, when businesses fail and real estate values decrease,
banks and financing companies have to deal with more
foreclosures. Environmental site assessments are performed on
most foreclosure properties to protect the bank from
Superfundliability, and also to determine any "environmental
costs" associated with the property when estimating its resale
value.
Secondly, banking regulators have tightened the internal
requirements by which bankers must operate. This adds to the
conservative atmosphere in the financial industries and leads
bankers to require environmental assessments and testing on
24
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properties whiCh previously may have gone unevaluated.
The simplification of the 2lE process is essential if mill
sites are to become more valued and marketable industrial
properties. As long as regulatory inconsistencies exist,
industrial developers and users will have little chance of
obtaining project financing, even for the rehabilitation types of
improvements that are necessary in old mill buildings.
In the following Chapter, rec(~nt and proposed changes to the
2lE Law and the MCP will be reviewed and examined to determine
whether environmental regulation for hazardous waste cleanup can
parallel the need to expand on the economic development potential
of older industrial sites.
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IV CHANGES TO THE LAW - "SON OF 21E"
Whether it be approval from the local conservation
commission or floodplain permitting authority, environmental
review and the necessary go-aheads can be frustrating and
cumbersome for even the most sophisticated industrial or
commercial developer. However, it is the enigma of 2lE that has
created the single greatest environmental obstacle for the
reindustrialization of older, mill communities.
It has become increasingly clear to all concerned parties
that the bureaucratization of hazardous waste management has
created severe financial hardship for property owners, while
actually stalling the decontamination process for which it was
intended.
Recognizing the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of many of
its policies, the DEP's Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup has issued a
series of policy changes in the past two (2) years to respond to
certain inadequacies and inconsistencies in the Law and the MCP.
Policy #SWC-601-90 describes the circumstances under which
the Department will allow a "Potentially Responsible Party" (PRP)
to assume responsibility for response actions at a publicly
funded site. The PRP may be "newly identified or one who
previously declined responsibility, or who was unable or was not
allowed to take responsibility and now would like to do so. The
policy identifies assurances the Department needs from a PRP and
conditions under which the Department will allow a PRP to take
17
over the responsibility for performing response actions."
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Additionally, on January 23, 1991, the Secretary of Environmental
Affairs and Commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Protection announced a joint Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
which formalized the relationship between the Massachusetts
Contingency Plan and the MEPA regulations. specifically, the MOU
states that "no ENF (Environmental Notification Form) or EIR
(Environmental Impact Report) shall be required for a project
that meets only the review threshold established in 301 CMR
11.26(7) (g)2 [permanent on site contai~ment, on site treatment,
or off site disposal of hazardous materials where the total
project cost (including design and engineering, excluding initial
remedial measures) is $1 million or more], provided that the
provisions set forth at 310 CMR 40.204, 310 CMR 40.543(4) (c) and
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310 CMR 40.546(7) (c) are followed." The MOU is intended as an
interim rule awaiting formal amendment to the MEPA regulations.
These policy changes represent apparent attempts by the
State's environmental regulators to both simplify and expedite
the 21E review process. They have also run concurrent with the
work of a study committee initiated by the Weld Administration
which has been meeting for the past year to recommend
improvements to 21E and the MCP. The committee has broadbased
support including representatives from major environmental
groups, the association of bankers, realtors, engineers, and
lawyers, and the DEP. Each group has given support and expertise
to a new legislative bill detaining comprehensive changes to the
existing 21E.
House Bill 5891 would restructure the Commonwealth's oil and
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Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup Program, which is administered by
the Department of Environmental Protection under Chapter 21E of
the General Laws. Specific provisions of this legislation would:
- Establish a program for the licensing of consultants to act as
"site professionals" who monitor assessment and/or cleanup work
being performed on behalf of private sector responsible parties
(Section 2, which adds sec. 19-19J to c. 2IA).
- Authorize DEP to establish a two-tiered classification system
delineating the many sites where private parties could proceed
without the agency's prior approval and those fewer sites where
responsible parties would need to acquire DEP permits before
performing work (Section 3, which amends sec. 3(d) of c. 21E).
- Guarantee timely action by the agency on permit applications,
require DEP to refund application fees when deadlines are not
met and assign a high priority to the review of those
applications on which timelines have been missed (Section 1,
which adds sec. 3B to c. 21E).
- Provide incentives for private sector responsible parties to
undertake assessment and cleanup work on their own, as well as
expanded enforcement authority for DEP to require private
sector action (Section 28, which adds sec. 4A to c. 21E).
- Authorize DEP to audit private sector assessments and cleanups
to ensure that public health and the environment are being
adequately protected (Section 23, which amends sec. 3A of
c. 21E).
- Clarify the liability of secured lenders and fiduciary trusts
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for the assessment and cleanup of contaminated properties, to
protect their interests (Sections 3, 4, 6 and 8, which amend sec.
2 of c. 2lE).
In addition to accelerating cleanups and removing obstacles
to economic development and real estate transactions, the
legislation will focus DEP resources on finding and cleaning up
the Commonwealth's most serious sites. That reallocation of
staff will result in more consistent and timely response to oil
spills and other emergencies; a stronger site discovery program,
to ensure that the state's most seriously contaminated sites are
being found and cleaned up; and the development of clear
standards for determining both when sites need to be cleaned up
19and when they are clean enough.
From industries' perspective, one of the most significant
aspects of the legislation is the shift in responsibility for
assuring cleanup to the private sector, namely private engineers
and consultants. The licensing of site professionals (LSP's)
with an option of roles-assessment, design and/or oversight was
critical to the Bill because the new LSP program should make
insurance more available to professionals, partly because the
licensing and vetting procedure would gold-plate their
credentials.
Another important aspect of the new Bill is the two-tier
notification system which should alleviate the lengthy and
burdensome priority, non-priority, and waiver structure of the
MCP. Except for major or imminently dangerous releases, the DEP
will step back from the process, requiring only a single permit
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and the hiring of an LSP.
Under House Bill 5891 DEP will put their requirements in
writing. Notification, assessment and cleanup criteria will be
codified. Deadlines, with money-back guarantees, will be set for
permit review. The flowchart for the entire procedure fits on
one page and has eight avenues of escape (no further action).
The end result will be an easier path out of the Superfund maze.
PRPs, by voluntarily starting cleanup, can save time and money
and gain the assurance that the DEP will be off their backs for
20
good.
House Bill 5891 addresses a majority of the concerns heard
from industry, engineers, banks, and government officials. The
major obstacles to the proposed amendments being implemented are
time and money. The Bill must be enacted by December 31, 1991
and implemented under law by July 1, 1992. The major hold-up at
this time is funding which is estimated at approximately $17
million per year. Fees should account for one-half of that
amount with the balance having to come from either a new tax or
as Governor Weld has suggested the General Fund. Interestingly,
the study committee made up of individuals primarily from the
private sector endorsed the ideas for dedicated taxes on retail
sales of petroleum and a first-use tax on certain hazardous
chemicals.
From a regulatory standpoint, HB 5891 presents an
opportunity for imporving the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Massachusetts Contingency Plan. From a legislative standpoint
there remains glaring problems with 21E, the Law. Most prominent
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is the absence of a long-range plan to address the issues of
hazardous wastes. How clean is clean remains unanswered.
Moreover, no commitment is given to research and development, and
the new technologies required for meeting the long-term problems
of hazardous waste identification and remediation.
For the time being, new streamlin~d regulations are a
commendable feat. However, in the lonq-run, further study is
needed to give 2lE greater purpose and meaning. The long term
challenge for public policymakers is vital to both the economic
and environmental well-being of the State of Massachusetts.
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V CONCLUSION
Chapter 21E and the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP)
have created enormous bureaucratic obstacles for industrial and
commercial propertyowners held liable for hazardous waste
cleanup. While few would argue with the need for strong
legislation forcing hazardous waste site cleanups, the costs and
delays associated with the remediation process have created
economic disincentives, and has potentially exacerbated the site
contamination it was intended to control. The Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP), whose responsibility it is to
administer the MCP, have too few resources to handle the sites
they know that endanger public health and safety.
House Bill 5891, also referred to as "Son of 2lE" if enacted
~
will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the MCP.
Industry, bankers, realtors lawyers, and engineers have all
supported the proposed legislation. The Bill still faces an
uphill battle given the funding level required to implement the
new amendments. The $17 million budget appears justifiable given
the $12 billion overall budget.
The budget issue is a commitment issue for the State, which
will also have serious implications nationwide. The commitment
issue is one of long-range planning to ensure that substantive
changes are made to the Law that would link environmental
protection to economic development. New technologies for
remediating hazardous wastes would be more forthcoming if a
commitment to research and development was built into the Law.
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The proposed ideas for dedicated taxes on retail sales of
petroleum and a first use tax on certain hazardous chemicals
merit consideration. Many economists would argue that taxes of
this nature are a far less disincentive to industry than
ambiguous laws and imposing regulation. If "best available
technology" is to be applied in environmental regulation, than
the incentive must exist for industry t~odevelop its own best
response.
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APPENDIX A
RESPONSE ACTION STATUS - DEP
) ) j
RESPONSE ACTION STATUS
(all sites and locations, as 01 9/15/91)
Unassigned 65%.
-. Not Moving
Unassigned
2% P~.I.'.l.__ ll •••
• VIIll
. . Approved
12% Waivers
Publicly 5%
.Funded
Total Number of Sites • 4994
Privately Funded
16% WIOversight
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